Conflict of Orders

The Proxy for M. Decius Bellicus rises

"I would ask my friend Proximus Maximus who would be the one mandating this vote? What is currently in place with the Lex that provides for someone outside of the presiding magistrate to decide what is put forward for a vote? I understand the rationale behind the introduction of this measure, but this seems like a rather extreme rewriting of the governmental history of the Republic to counteract the actions of one..." looks towards Aurelius Cotta "cross individual.

"Nay, I must take this a step further and say that the Republic was built upon the idea that the balance between the two Consuls was something that the Senate should not interfere with and, after one previous Consul decided to get rather heavy-handed with his vetoes, the sense of the Senate, or a few Senators, seems to be that we should just scarp the process instead of potentially looking into whether the actions precipitating this legislation are worthy of investigation and possibly punishment."

Proximus Maximus stands to speak

Good and Honest Senator,

I have faith in the Senate, this Republic and the mos mairorum to ensure that all laws and senatorial procedures are followed and observed as they should be. For that reason, we have two consuls to counteract the actions of other magistrates and of their own colleagues in the event they stray from the proper rule of law and norms of behavior.

To ease your concerns, perhaps once the Consul Cassius Vecellinus clarifies my earlier point, we can include an oath by every and all Senators to abide by the letter of this law and prevent any obstructionist actions committed to prevent a lawful vote and appointment of governors, if and when this law is passed.

Allectus Fabius Maximus wrote: ↑Wed Jan 26, 2022 12:11 pm Proximus Maximus stood up to speak when called to do so

Conscript Fathers,

I wish for a clarification from Consul Cassius Vecellinus with regards to Article V of LEX DE ELIGENDIS MAGISTRATIBUS PROVINCIALIBUS.

V. Should the Consuls fail to come to a joint agreement or the Senate vote against the proposal as put forth by the former, an immediate vote will begin on a province-by-province basis where candidates who have made a candidacy and those who names have been put forth by the Consuls under Article IV will be considered.

If passed into law, and if my understanding of law and Senatorial procedure is still well regarded and up to date, it would mean that the Senate would be compelled to vote on who would become the promagistrate of a province and be required to pick among those who announced their candidacies and those nominated by the sitting consuls. Since it would have the force of law, the vote and those who qualify for the appointment would not be able to be vetoed by any consul, presiding magistrate or even tribune.

Is that correct?

Senator Fabius,

You touch the crux of the matter with a needle.

It is my understanding of our tradition that intercessio (veto) may not be used to obstruct any aspect of the Senate's proceedings except the outcome of the vote itself. In that case, the outcome of the vote would still be recorded into the annals as a senatus auctoritas (will of the senate) rather than a senatus consultum.

However, as you state, it is possible for a Lex to mandate that intercessio may not be used in specific cases. While I have not included such a clause in this specific draft proposal it may be an idea to forestall that potential deadlock.

I yield the floor.

Quintus Quintius Quietus chortled mirthfully, his portly body jiggling, some men were all piss and vinegar. Turning to the Consul he spoke.

Conscript Fathers,

Good Consul Cassius Vecellinus, I have a question of your proposed lex. Is it your intention that promagistrates appeal for their own prorogatio? Doing so would feel irregular, if not slightly un-Roman, or is that the intent of this proposal? To encourage a regular rotation of qualified men through those positions?

Conscript fathers,

If you might forgive one minor comment:

The motion is mostly fine.

The suggested amendment is of some severe concern.

However one might feel about the use of Vetoes, I would note that the Senate moving to restrict the right of a Plebeian Tribune to intercede would almost certainly lead to a veto of any motion out before this august body. And any attempt at enforcing such a motion on the “will of the senate” would almost certainly lead to a renewal of the Conflict of the Orders.

Even if this is simply kept to the Consular magistrates, the Tribune of the Plebs would still retain the right to intercede, why would this be denied to the Consuls? On what grounds would a tribune Have excess authority to a Consul?

The proxy of Consul Furius Pavo waves off the words just spoken.

I think it best if this body ignore the words of Aurelius Cotta when it comes to Consular vetoes. He vetoed more lex than any previous Consul in years and went beyond that to attempt to silence the Senate through aggression and intimidation - attempting and failing to break their right to absolute free speech which no Consul can infringe upon.

Ignore him, for he obviously seeks to retain the levers of power he used to abuse Rome.

The proxy for M. Decius Bellicus rises, with a snap of his fingers

"So we gather more truth about the intent of this bill, as frivolous as the bill itself may be. If the intent of this proposal were to prevent from the abuse of the veto, if you will, which was exercised more forcefully by the Consul Aurelius Cotta than he exercised any other aspect of his job...aside from his purse...then there's nothing written here that fall within the bounds of how this government functions that would prevent such an occurrence from being repeated.

"Indeed, if we are concerned about the abuse of power, or the accusation of an abuse of power, then there are codified processes in place that the Senate can exercise to prevent such an occurrence from happening again. However, I do not see why we would want to so radically attempt to change the functions of the Republic, which have stood for time immemorial, after the actions of one would-be petty tyrant, instead of looking to punish the petty-tyrant himself.

"If we wish to prevent a Consular abuse of power, we should perhaps show that such an action would have consequences, instead of turning the Republic on its head."

I support the proposed lex without any additions that affect the rights of veto. This lex largely follows our traditional principles however In doing so removes any ambiguity from the process. The Senate is still empowered to reject unworthy candidates, should it choose to.

The veto can be abused, yes, but it is also a vital safeguard in our system of government to prevent tyranny and abuse of office. One may use it to stall good governance while another may stall the bad. In the context of this lex the veto would simply be the rejection of the candidate(s) forcing a new one to be produced.

The Proxy rises

"A. Valerius Marius,

Section V would prevent any sort of veto from occurring. Not only does it prevent a veto from being able to occur, it would take away the prerogative of the Consul to decide the matter upon which a vote is being held.

V. Should the Consuls fail to come to a joint agreement or the Senate vote against the proposal as put forth by the former, an immediate vote will begin on a province-by-province basis where candidates who have made a candidacy and those who names have been put forth by the Consuls under Article IV will be considered.